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Abstract
Conventional tort law bars victims of exposure to a toxic substance from filing
suit until they actually develop symptoms of illness. Practically speaking, this
rule often bars recovery due to bankruptcy and causal uncertainty. One solution
is to allow victims to file at exposure for expected damages (a tort for risk). The
trade-off is that such a rule may trigger a race to file among exposure victims,
thereby itself inducing bankruptcy. This paper characterizes the conditions under
which such a race will occur in equilibrium and examines the implications for
social welfare.
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A Tort for Risk and Endogenous Bankruptcy

1. Introduction
Environmental accidents often involve mass exposure to a toxic substance that
creates (or increases) the risk of future illness. Examples include accidental chemical
releases such as the one that occurred in Bhopal, India in 1984 (Fischer, 1996), nuclear
accidents such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and prolonged exposure to asbestos.
Under traditional tort law, victims of such exposure cannot file damage claims until they
actually develop symptoms of illness.1 However, the long latency period of many
illnesses, the difficulty of proving causation, and the possibility of injurer bankruptcy, all
act as effective bars against recovery. Thus, some scholars have argued that victims
should have the option to sue for expected damages at the time of exposure, in effect
treating the exposure itself as a tort--what we will call a “tort for risk” (TFR) (Love,
1996).
Several previous authors have examined the tradeoffs involved in allowing a tort
for risk.2 A key concern is the impact on litigation costs. While Robinson (1985) has
argued that allowing a tort for risk would drastically increase the number of lawsuits and
hence total litigation costs, advocates suggest an offsetting deterrence benefit. In many
toxic tort contexts, there is a long latency period between the time of exposure and the
time a resulting disease is manifested. As a result, requiring victims to wait until the time
of illness to file suit could actually bar victims from receiving any compensation if the
1

See Keeton, et al. (1984), §30, p. 165. In some jurisdictions, victims can sue for emotional distress and/or
the costs of medical monitoring (Valk, 1995; Miceli and Segerson, forthcoming).
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injurer is insolvent or judgment-proof at the time the disease is contracted, or if the victim
cannot establish a causal connection between her illness and the injurer’s actions
(Shavell, 1985). This affects both the extent of victim compensation and the injurer’s
incentive to take care to reduce the magnitude or likelihood of exposure. While victim
compensation is primarily a distributional issue,3 increased injurer care affects the
expected damages from exposure and hence social welfare.
The concern about insolvency that underlies the above argument is based on an
assumption that the risk that the injurer will be insolvent or judgment-proof at the time of
illness is exogenous, i.e., driven by factors unrelated to liability. However, in large toxic
tort cases where total liability can be large relative to a firm’s assets, it is also possible for
the liability itself to trigger bankruptcy if the firm has insufficient assets to cover the
liability-related claims against it. A well-known example is the bankruptcy of the JohnsManville Sales Corporation, which was triggered by the costs stemming from asbestos
litigation (Note, 1983). This possibility raises an additional concern about allowing a tort
for risk, namely, that it might drive a firm into bankruptcy when a traditional rule of only
allowing suits at the time of illness would not have. Bankruptcy can entail a loss of
social welfare (i.e., a reduction in economic efficiency), if it implies that an activity that
on balance is socially beneficial (i.e., that makes an expected net positive contribution to
social welfare) cannot be undertaken. This effect must be combined with the effect on
litigation costs and deterrence to determine the overall impact on economic efficiency of
allowing a tort for risk.
2

See, for example, Landes and Posner (1984), Robinson (1985), and Miceli and Segerson (2003b). Also,
see the related analysis by Rose-Ackerman (1989).
3
Victim compensation is a reallocation of wealth from injurers to victims. Ex post, this reallocation affects
the distribution of welfare within society but not society’s total welfare. Of course, to the extent that a
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In this paper, we explore the relationship between a tort for risk and bankruptcy.
Specifically, we ask whether the introduction of a tort for risk ever induces bankruptcy
when it would not have occurred under the traditional rule. The reason that a tort for risk
might increase the likelihood of bankruptcy is the possibility that victims will “race to
file” at exposure for fear that the injurer will have insufficient assets later to pay actual
damage claims.4
Our analysis of a race to file is related to other contexts in which a race to claim a
firm’s limited assets triggers bankruptcy. The classic example is a bank run, in which
depositors rush to withdraw their assets from a bank because they expect other depositors
to do the same and want to beat them to ensure a greater claim on the bank’s limited
assets (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In a litigation context, Spier (2002) examines
settlement negotiations between a defendant and multiple plaintiffs whose collective
damages (if they win at trial) exceed the defendant’s assets. Both of these papers are
related to our analysis, but focus on different issues. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) focus
on the liquidity service provided by banks and the impact of runs on risk sharing among
risk averse depositors, while Spier (2002) focuses on the settlement-trial decisions of the
plaintiffs rather than on the timing of their filing decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss in more detail the
impact of allowing a tort for risk on litigation costs and deterrence when bankruptcy is
endogenous. This discussion draws heavily on the TFR model developed in Miceli and
Segerson (2003b). In the context considered there, litigation costs play a key role in

requirement of victim compensation causes injurers to invest more in prevention or care, it will indirectly
affect social welfare.
4
In this sense, bankruptcy is endogenous, whereas in most previous tort models it is treated as exogenous
(Shavell, 1986; Miceli and Segerson, 2003a).
3

inducing a possible race to file. In addition, the results depend on the assumption that
there are a large number of victims. This implies that each victim thinks her individual
filing decision will not have a sufficiently large impact to trigger bankruptcy. In addition,
under this assumption, once an exposure has occurred the injurer can reasonably assume
that a given share of victims will actually contract the illness. In Section 3 we consider
an alternative scenario. We abstract from litigation costs by assuming that they are zero
and focus instead on the “small” numbers case. In this setting, an individual victim’s
filing decision can trigger bankruptcy. In addition, the injurer must consider the
possibility that all exposure victims will contract the illness (the “worst case” scenario).5
We develop a simple model to examine the filing equilibria under this scenario when a
tort for risk is allowed. We again ask whether allowing a TFR will trigger a race to file
and bankruptcy, thereby preventing the firm from continuing to produce a product or
service that could potentially be socially beneficial. We first describe the basic model
and the equilibrium under the traditional tort rule. We then derive the equilibrium under
the TFR rule and compare it to the traditional rule in terms of efficiency and
compensation of victims. Finally, Section 4 concludes.

2. The Large Numbers Case with Litigation Costs
2.1 The Basic Model without Bankruptcy
Consider a scenario in which a (potential) injurer engages in an activity that
creates the possibility of an accidental exposure of a large population of victims to a

5

While the worst case scenario is technically possible under the large number case as well, the probability
that this will occur is sufficiently low when the number of exposure victims is high that the injurer can
reasonably ignore it.
4

harmful substance.6 The injurer can undertake activities that reduce the likelihood of an
accident, but these activities are costly. If an exposure occurs, a given victim may or may
not develop a related illness in the future. Let q be the probability that a victim ultimately
develops the illness, which we assume results in losses equal to D dollars.7 Assume that
all victims suffer the same loss in the event of illness, but that the probability of
developing the disease (q) varies across victims. In general, victims can be expected to
differ in terms of the intensity of their exposure (e.g., the duration of exposure or the
proximity to the point of release) and hence in their probabilities of contracting the
illness. We assume that each victim’s q is observable to the court so that it can calculate
that victim’s expected damages, qD, if necessary.
In terms of assessing liability on the injurer, we will consider two rules: the
traditional rule, under which a victim can only seek damages in period two if she sustains
an actual loss, and a tort for risk (TFR), under which a victim can sue in period one
(immediately following exposure) for expected damages of qD. We assume throughout
that liability is strict.8 In this case, under the traditional rule, and in the absence of any
bankruptcy consideration, exposure victims would be required to wait until they sustain
actual damages before filing suit. If they ultimately contract the disease and file suit,
they will receive a net return equal to their losses, D, less their litigation costs, denoted cv.
We assume that D>cv , so that filing suit if and when the illness occurs would be
profitable for all illness victims who expect to recover their full damages, yielding a net
6

See Miceli and Segerson (2003b) for a detailed description and analysis of the issues discussed in this
section.
7
If the losses take the form of lost wages, then losses are measured directly in dollars. If, on the other
hand, losses stem from non-monetary impairment, then D represents the monetary equivalent of those
losses.
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return of D-cv. In contrast, if a tort for risk is allowed, some victims could choose to file
at exposure instead. Victims who file at exposure would be able to recover only their
expected losses, qD. We assume (for simplicity) that the victim’s litigation costs are the
same under the traditional rule and under the tort for risk. Then, the net return from filing
at exposure would be qD-cv.
Clearly, in the absence of bankruptcy, if there were no litigation costs (cv=0), then
exposure victims would be indifferent between filing at exposure and at illness, since
both would yield the same expected return (qD).9 However, with positive litigation costs
(cv>0), in the absence of bankruptcy all accident victims would prefer to wait rather than
file at exposure since waiting yields a higher net return. Both options yield the same
expected award (qD). However, if an exposure victim files suit at the time of exposure,
she will incur litigation costs with certainty, while if she waits, she will incur these costs
only if she contracts the disease. Thus, if there is no possibility of bankruptcy, allowing a
tort for risk will have no impact on filing decision (i.e., the decision will be the same as
under the traditional rule), and hence no impact on the number of suits (which determines
total litigation costs) or deterrence. This result does not hold, however, if liability can
bankrupt the injurer.
2.2 The Filing Decision with Potential Bankruptcy
When liability can bankrupt the injurer, then under a tort for risk the victim faces
the following tradeoff in deciding whether to file at exposure or wait until the time of
illness. If she waits, she will save on litigation costs (in expected terms), as in the case

8

Thus, the injurer is liable for damages resulting from his activities, regardless of the level of care taken to
prevent the accidental release. We do not consider negligence-based rules, under which an injurer would
be liable only if he failed to meet the due standard of care.
9
This assumes that victims are risk neutral. We also ignore discounting for simplicity.
6

without bankruptcy. This is the benefit of waiting. The cost of waiting is the potential
reduction in the damage award if the injurer’s assets have been reduced or depleted by
other, earlier suits. Of course, this cost depends on the number of victims who choose to
file early (at exposure). Note that, since the expected savings in litigation costs decreases
with the probability that they will be incurred (i.e., the probability that the illness will
occur), the advantage of waiting will be lower for victims who are more likely to contract
the disease. Thus, the potential for bankruptcy creates a “threshold” result under which
high-exposure victims (i.e., those with a higher value of q) choose to file at exposure
while low-exposure victims choose to wait. The “cut-off” occurs at the exposure level
that makes a victim indifferent between filing at exposure and waiting.
Does this threshold result imply that a race to file will ensue if victims are
allowed to sue at exposure? The answer depends on the injurer’s asset level. If the
injurer would not have had sufficient assets to cover his expected liability-related costs
even in the absence of a tort for risk, then allowing a tort for risk will trigger a race to
file. At least some exposure victims (those with high exposure levels) will choose to file
at exposure in an attempt to secure a larger share of the injurer’s limited assets.
However, the race will be partial, meaning that some exposure victims (those with low
exposure levels) will choose to wait in the hope that they will not contract the illness and
hence never have to incur the litigation costs associated with a suit. This implies that a
tort for risk effectively creates a priority rule that gives high exposure victims first claim
on the injurer’s limited assets.
In contrast, if the injurer would have sufficient assets to cover the expected cost of
all illness suits (and hence would not be bankrupted under a traditional rule), then a race
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to file would not necessarily result if a tort for risk were allowed. If a victim does not
expect other victims to file early, then she will have no incentive to file early either.
However, if she expects others to file early, then she has an incentive to file early as well,
and a race to file that results in bankruptcy can ensue. Thus, allowing a tort for risk can
induce filing behavior that leads to bankruptcy when a traditional rule would not,
although it is also possible that it will not affect filing behavior at all.
2.3 The Impact on Litigation Costs and Deterrence
What, then, are the implications of the effect on filing behavior for litigation costs
and deterrence? Although a tort for risk induces some victims to file at exposure, it does
not necessarily increase the total number of lawsuits (and hence total litigation costs). If
exposure suits sufficiently reduce or exhaust the injurer’s assets, then some illness
victims will find suits at the time of illness unprofitable. Thus, while a tort for risk would
allow exposure suits, if the injurer has a sufficiently low asset level it could decrease the
number of illness suits and thus decrease the total number of suits as well.
The impact of filing on the injurer’s choice of care depends on its impact on his
expected liability-related costs. If allowing a tort for risk is expected to induce
bankruptcy while the traditional rule would not, then the tort for risk will increase total
expected costs for the injurer and hence provide the injurer with an incentive to increase
his care level in an effort to reduce those costs. However, if the injurer would have faced
bankruptcy under the traditional rule as well, then bankruptcy induced by allowing a tort
for risk (albeit at an earlier date) would generate the same expected total costs for the
injurer and hence the same incentives for care. Thus, while it is possible that allowing a
tort for risk will increase care incentives, this outcome is not guaranteed.

8

The results summarized above regarding the impact of allowing a tort for risk
were based on several assumptions: (1) that litigation costs are positive; (2) that there
are a large number of victims so that any individual victim’s filing decision cannot trigger
bankruptcy, and injurers can reasonably predict the share of exposure victims who will
actually contract the illness; and (3) that capital markets are perfect so that injurers can
borrow against future earnings to pay current liability-related costs. This last assumption
implies that whether or not bankruptcy occurs depends not on current assets but on the
stream of assets over time. In practice, capital market imperfections may prevent intertemporal borrowing against future assets, implying that bankruptcy occurs when current
claims exceed current assets.
In the following section, we consider the implications of allowing a tort for risk
under an alternative scenario, namely, where (i) the number of victims is small (hence
injurer’s face the real possibility that all victims would contract the disease, and a single
victim’s filing decision can trigger bankruptcy), and (ii) capital markets are imperfect so
that bankruptcy occurs when current liability-related costs exceed current assets. The
inability to borrow against future earnings implies that bankruptcy in an earlier period
could reduce efficiency by preventing the injurer from engaging in a future activity that
might be socially valuable. In order to focus on these two issues, we ignore litigation
costs, which played a crucial role in the results derived above. In addition, to simplify
the model, we assume that all victims face the same probability of contracting the illness
if exposed, i.e., all have the same exposure intensity (same value of q). Thus, the
threshold result discussed above (which hinged on differences in exposure intensity) no
longer plays a role in the equilibrium. As before, we examine the equilibrium filing
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strategy for the victims, and its implications for bankruptcy and the existence of a race to
file. Because litigation costs are assumed to be zero, we do not consider the impact of a
tort for risk on total litigation costs. Likewise, we do not consider the implications for
injurer care, since they would follow closely the principles driving the deterrence effects
under the previous scenario.
3. The Small Numbers Case with Imperfect Capital Markets
3.1 The Basic Model
For simplicity, we consider a model with two periods and two victims. At the
start of the first period the two victims are exposed to a toxic substance. As a result, both
face a probability q of becoming ill in the second period (0<q<1), in which case they will
sustain damages of D dollars. Thus, their expected damages as of period one are qD.
The injurer has A1 assets in period one with which to pay damages, and if it remains in
business in period two, it will generate an additional A2 in assets (net profit).10 However,
if the injurer goes bankrupt in period one, it will not realize the A2 assets. Thus, we can
think of the foregone period two assets as the efficiency cost of bankruptcy. (Since the
model is limited to two periods, bankruptcy in period two has no efficiency effects.)
As before, we consider two possible liability rules, the traditional rule and a tort
for risk. Under both rules, we assume that filing suit is costless and continue to assume
that liability is strict. If the injurer is bankrupted in either period as a result of lawsuits,
its remaining assets are fully distributed (in equal shares if there are multiple plaintiffs).
As noted, we assume that capital market imperfections prevent the injurer from
borrowing in period one against its expected period two assets.

10

We assume that only net profits are available to pay damages. Thus, for example, input suppliers have a
prior claim on the injurer’s revenues compared to victims.
10

Finally, to make the model interesting, we assume that a single victim filing a
TFR suit in period one cannot bankrupt the injurer. However, if both victims file in
period one, the injurer will be bankrupted. Thus,
qD < A1 < 2qD.

(1)

This assumption isolates the effect of the joint decisions of the victims on the injurer’s
solvency. (Specifically, only a “race to file” will bankrupt the injurer in period one.) We
do not, however, place any a priori restrictions on the magnitude of A2. Thus, we
characterize the equilibrium behavior of victims for different values of A2, or
equivalently, for different values of total assets, A≡A1+A2, given (1).
3.2 Equilibrium under the Traditional Rule
We first consider the outcome under the traditional rule. Here, the only decision
of victims is whether or not to file in period two if they become ill. Since filing is
costless and liability is strict, they will always do so. Thus, the injurer faces the
following possible period-two outcomes: (1) neither victim becomes ill, which occurs
with probability (1−q)2; (2) one victim becomes ill, which occurs with probability
2q(1−q); and (3) both victims become ill, which occurs with probability q2. Summing the
damages in each case weighted by the probabilities yields expected damages as of period
one equal to 2qD. Thus, if the injurer’s total assets over the two periods are such that
A>2qD, then it is solvent in an expected sense since its total assets exceed its expected
liability. The injurer may nevertheless go bankrupt in actual terms, depending on its total
assets and which of the above outcomes actually occurs. Although bankruptcy in this
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case has no efficiency effects, it may limit the injurer’s ability to compensate victims who
become ill, a purely distributional concern.11
The possible cases are as follows:
A > 2D,

the firm is never bankrupt;

(2.1)

D < A < 2D, the firm is bankrupt only if both victims
become ill;

(2.2)

A< D,

(2.3)

the firm is bankrupt if one or both victims
become ill.

In the next section, we compare these outcomes to those that can occur under the TFR
rule.
3.3 Equilibria under the Tort for Risk Rule
Under a TFR, an exposure victim can file in period one for damages of qD, or
wait until she becomes ill in period two and file for D. The two victims make their filing
decisions simultaneously and either choose to file “now” (at exposure) or “wait” to file
until they actually become ill. Thus, there are four possible outcomes: (wait, wait), (now,
wait), (wait, now), and (now, now). The outcome where both wait corresponds to the
traditional rule, while the other three involve a TFR suit by at least one victim. It is easy
to show that the injurer’s expected liability under each outcome is 2qD, which is the same
as under the traditional rule. Thus, absent the threat of bankruptcy, the two rules are
equivalent in expected terms. As before, however, the actual outcomes in each case
involve different amounts of liability, and may lead to bankruptcy, depending on the
injurer’s assets. This can lead to different outcomes under the two rules.

11

Obviously, if deterrence of the original exposure were an issue, an inability to fully compensate victims
in either period would have efficiency effects due to the judgment proof problem.
12

If both victims wait, they behave identically under the TFR and the traditional
rule, and the possible outcomes are those described in (2). If one victim files at exposure
and the other waits, the following two outcomes are possible:
A > (q+1)D,

the firm is never bankrupt;

(3.1)

A < (q+1)D,

the firm is bankrupt in period two
if the victim who waits becomes ill.

(3.2)

As under the traditional rule, only period-two bankruptcy is possible in this case, which,
as noted, has purely distributional implications. Finally, if both victims file at exposure,
the injurer is bankrupted in period one, given A1<2qD. This last case (the race to file) is
especially interesting because it is the only one in which bankruptcy in period one occurs,
producing an efficiency loss (failure to realize A2), as well as possible distributional
effects.
In order to derive the equilibrium outcomes under a TFR, consider the normal
form of the victims’ filing game as shown in Figure 1. (The first payoff in each cell is for
victim one, and the second is for victim two.) Given that A1<2qD, if both victims choose
to file now, the injurer goes bankrupt in period one and each victim receives half of his
first period assets, or A1/2. If one victim files now and the other waits, the one filing now
gets qD (since A1>qD), while the other has an expected payoff of qD−x, where x=0 if the
injurer has enough assets in period two to pay the victim’s damages if she becomes ill,
and x>0 if it does not. Finally, if both victims wait to file, each has an expected payoff of
qD−y, where y=0 if the injurer’s assets are expected to cover its total liability and y>0 if
not. Obviously, the equilibrium of the filing game depends on the specific magnitudes of
x and y, which in turn depend on A. We consider several cases.
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Case 1: A ≥2D. In this case, the injurer is never bankrupted by liability, even in
the worst case (“catastrophic”) scenario where both victims wait to file suit and both
become ill. Thus, x=y=0, and there are three pure strategy equilibria of the filing game:
{(wait, wait), (now, wait), (wait, now)}.12 In addition, there are an infinite number of
mixed strategy equilibria where one player plays the pure strategy “wait” and the other
randomizes between the two strategies with an arbitrary probability.13 Under all of these
equilibria, both victims are fully compensated (either in actual terms if they wait, or in
expected terms if they file a TFR suit), and the injurer remains in business for both
periods. Thus, the equilibria are also efficient in the sense that the injurer realizes its
period-two assets. In this case, there is no effective difference between the traditional and
TFR rules (except that some victims are compensated in expected terms and others in
actual terms).14
Case 2: (q+1)D ≤ A < 2D. In this case, the injurer is only bankrupted if both
victims wait to file and both become ill, in which case each receives half of the injurer’s
total assets, or A/2. Thus, if both wait, each has an expected payoff of
q(1−q)D + q2(A/2) = qD − q2[D−(A/2)],
which implies
y = q2[D−(A/2)]>0.

(4)

However, if only one victim waits and becomes ill the injurer can cover the liability.
Thus, x=0.
12

In the two pure strategy equilibria where one victim files now and one waits, there is nothing in the
model to determine which victim adopts which strategy. In the case where victims differ in their risk of
developing illness (i.e., they differ in their values of q) and litigation is costly, we showed above that
victims with lower risk wait to file while those with higher risk file at exposure.
13
If we let pi∈[0,1] be the probability that player i files now, then the reaction functions for the two players
coincide with the axes of the unit square in (p1,p2) space.

14

In this case, there are two pure strategy equilibria of the filing game: {(now, wait),
(wait, now)}, and one mixed strategy equilibrium where each player files now with
probability
p* =

y
,
y + (qD − ( A1 / 2))

(5)

and waits with the complementary probability.15 Note that all of these equilibria are
efficient in the sense that the injurer is never bankrupted in period one. However, there is
an important distributional difference between the pure strategy equilibria and the mixed
strategy equilibrium. In the former, victims are fully compensated because the injurer is
not bankrupted in either period (as in Case 1). In contrast, under the mixed strategy
equilibrium both victims may end up waiting to file in period two, and if both become ill,
the injurer is bankrupted. Thus, although the equilibria are all efficient (because only
period two bankruptcy is possible), the pure strategy equilibria are preferable to the
mixed strategy equilibrium because they guarantee full compensation of both victims.
Intuitively, the pure strategy equilibria avoid bankruptcy by allowing the injurer
to pay expected damages of qD to one victim in period one with certainty, thereby
leaving it with enough assets in period two to pay actual damages of D should the other
victim become ill. Interestingly, to the extent that the pure strategy equilibria are
expected to emerge in this case, the TFR rule actually lowers the risk of bankruptcy
compared to the traditional rule under which period two bankruptcy is always possible
when A<2D.

14

If a victim who receives expected damages uses it to buy market insurance against a future loss, then she
will receive compensation for her actual loss in the event of illness.
15
Note that p* is strictly between zero and one given y>0 in this case and (1). In this case, the reaction
functions intersect at three points in (p1,p2) space: (1,0), (0,1), and (p*,p*).
15

Case 3: (A1/2q)+qD< A< (q+1)D. In this case, the injurer goes bankrupt in
period two if even one victim waits to file and becomes ill. Thus, the expected payoff
from waiting to file, given that the other victim files now, is
q(A−qD) = qD − q[(q+1)D−A].
It follows that
x = q[(q+1)D−A] >0,

(6)

while y continues to be given by (4). Although x>0, the types of equilibria in this case
are the same as in Case 2 if qD−x>(A1/2), or, substituting from (6), if
(A1/2q)+qD < A,

(7)

which defines the lower bound on A in this case. Thus, there are again two pure strategy
equilibria:{(now, wait), (wait, now)}, and a single mixed strategy equilibrium where each
player files now with probability
p* =

y
.
y + [(qD − x) − ( A1 / 2)]

(8)

As in Case 2, the equilibria are all efficient in the sense that the firm is never
bankrupted in period one, but in contrast to Case 2, even the pure strategy equilibria in
this case result in period two bankruptcy if the victim who waits becomes ill. Thus, the
victim who files suit at exposure is assured full compensation (in expected terms), while
the one who waits is undercompensated if he becomes ill. In comparison, if period two
bankruptcy occurs under the traditional rule (cases (2.2) and (2.3)), any victims who
become ill are undercompensated.
Case 4: A=(A1/2q)+qD. In this case, if one victim files now, the other victim is
indifferent between waiting and filing now (i.e., qD−x=(A1/2)). As a result, there are
three pure strategy equilibria: {(now, wait), (wait, now), (now, now)}, and an infinite
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number of mixed strategy equilibria where one player plays the pure strategy “now” and
the other randomizes between the two strategies with an arbitrary probability. (This case
thus mirrors Case 1.)16 The injurer is bankrupted in period two if one party waits and
becomes ill (as in Case 3), and is bankrupted in period one if both file now. This
therefore represents the first case in which period one bankruptcy can occur as a result of
a “race to file.” If it does, it not only leaves victims undercompensated (even in expected
terms), it is also inefficient in that the injurer does not realize his period two assets. In
this case, the TFR rule is welfare-reducing and is also inferior to the traditional rule in
terms of compensation.
Case 5: A<(A1/2q)+qD. In this case, victims strictly prefer to file now, regardless
of the other victim’s choice. Thus, (now, now) is a dominant strategy, and a race to file is
the only equilibrium. Again, the TFR is inferior to the traditional rule, both in terms of
efficiency and compensation of victims.
To summarize, the preceding cases have shown that the equilibrium impact of a
TFR rule varies depending on the level of the injurer’s inter-temporal assets. This
dependence is depicted graphically in Figure 2, which shows the regions where each case
is relevant in (A2, A1) space. When total assets are sufficiently large (case 1), the TFR has
no real effect either in terms of efficiency or compensation of victims. For intermediate
asset levels (cases 2 and 3), the TFR has no efficiency effect, and it may actually increase
the ability of injurers to compensate victims by allowing them to pay expected damages
up front to some victims and possibly to avoid period two bankruptcy. However, for
sufficiently low asset levels (cases 4 and 5), a TFR potentially has detrimental effects on

16

That is, the reaction functions coincide with the outer edges of the unit square in (p1,p2) space.
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both efficiency and compensation by possibly triggering a “race to file” among victims
that bankrupts the firm prematurely.
4. Conclusion

Conventional tort law bars victims of exposure to a toxic substance from filing
suit for damages until they actually become ill. This rule often has the practical effect,
however, of denying victims compensation because, by the time the illness arises, the
injurer may have gone bankrupt for reasons unrelated to liability. A possible solution to
this problem is to allow victims to file at exposure--that is, to create a tort for risk. The
tradeoff is that this rule may trigger a race to file among exposure victims (who fear
future bankruptcy), thereby itself inducing bankruptcy.
Our comparison of a tort for risk with the traditional rule under both scenarios we
considered showed that a race to file can indeed arise in equilibrium under certain
conditions, particularly for firms that have relatively low inter-temporal asset streams. If
the injurer’s asset level is sufficiently high that there is no threat of bankruptcy, then
allowing a tort for risk will have no effect on filing behavior since there will be no
incentive for victims to file early. Thus, the impact of allowing a tort for risk stems from
the possibility of bankruptcy.
The filing behavior induced by allowing a tort for risk can have several
implications. First, when a firm’s total assets are sufficiently low, it can actually trigger
bankruptcy (perhaps pre-maturely), implying that bankruptcy is endogenously
determined by the liability rule. Such an outcome is undesirable, both because it can be
inefficient (if it prevents a future activity that is socially beneficial), and because it may
leave victims under-compensated. However, for healthier firms, the rule may actually
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have the desirable effect of staving off bankruptcy from future tort suits by allowing the
firm to pay some of its liability in expected terms, thereby leaving it enough assets to pay
any future illness claims in full. In this way, the rule functions like liability insurance for
firms.
Second, allowing a tort for risk can affect the total number of suits brought by
victims. However, the results of Section 2 imply that the impact on litigation costs is
unclear. In some cases, total litigation costs could increase, while in others they might
decrease. Ceteris paribus, litigation costs are more likely to increase under a tort for risk
when the injurer’s asset level is high (but the threat of bankruptcy still exists).
Finally, if allowing a tort for risk increases total expected liability-related costs, it
can also increase the injurer’s incentives to take care. This can occur if the tort for risk
triggers bankruptcy when it would not have occurred under the traditional rule.
However, it is also possible that allowing a tort for risk will actually lower the injurer’s
risk of bankruptcy compared to the traditional rule.
These conclusions suggest that, in addition to affecting both the amount and the
nature of victim compensation, a tort for risk can have several welfare effects, which can
work in opposite directions. Thus, taken together, the results from Sections 2 and 3
imply that the welfare impacts of allowing a tort for risk are ambiguous, and likely to
depend on the injurer’s asset level.
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Figure 1. Victims’ filing game, normal form.
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Figure 2. Regions where various equilibria exist.

23

A1

